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COOTER & GELL v. HARTMARX CORP.: FEDERAL RULE
11 SANCTIONS AND THE INEQUITABLE
APPLICATION OF THE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION STANDARD OF
REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (Rule 11) enables courts to sanc-
tion attorneys and parties for filing frivolous lawsuits.1 After Rule 1l's
1983 amendment,2 federal circuit courts of appeals interpreted it broadly,
liberally using judicial sanctions to deter litigation conduct that reflects
poorly upon the legal profession.3 Amended Rule 11 expressly mandates
that courts impose sanctions upon finding a violation of the Rule.4
This Note examines the history of Rule 11, the reasons for the 1983
amendment and the changes resulting from the amendment. It then
presents the policy arguments favoring and opposing the amended Rule.
Finally, the uniform standard of reviewing Rule 11 decisions set out by
the United States Supreme Court in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. I is
examined and an appropriate interpretation of this standard for review-
ing district court sanction orders is proposed.
Because a review of factual issues requires a different standard of
review than that of legal issues, a sanction decision-involving issues of
both fact and law-is difficult for appellate courts to review. This com-
plexity has led the federal circuits to apply different standards when re-
viewing sanction orders.6 In Cooter & Gell the Supreme Court mandated
a uniform abuse of discretion standard,7 thereby limiting and simplifying
the scope of appellate review. However, by limiting the scope of appel-
late review for all Rule 11 decisions to a deferential standard, sanction
decisions based on findings of law are receiving inadequate scrutiny.'
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
2. See infra note 38 for the text of amended Rule 11.
3. Edna S. Epstein & Charles M. Shaffer, Jr., Introduction to FED. PROCEDURE
COMM'N, AM. BAR ASS'N, SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS 3 (Edna S. Epstein et
al. eds., 1986).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 states in pertinent part that upon finding a violation, "the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction." Id. (emphasis added).
5. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
6. See infra part III.
7. See infra notes 230-36 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 246-53, 262-76 and accompanying text.
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This result may chill attorney creativity and stifle new developments in
the law. This Note argues that the standard of review mandated in
Cooter & Gell be interpreted as a three-tiered approach,9 which would
enable a court to address properly the various questions of law, fact and
discretion inherent in a Rule 11 sanction order.l0
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. History of Rule 11
Rule 11 requires an attorney to sign pleadings, motions and other
papers, certifying that to the best of his or her "knowledge, information,
and belief,"" the pleading is "formed after reasonable inquiry... is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argu-
ment for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."' 2 The
Rule also requires that the pleading not be "interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless in-
crease in the cost of litigation."
' 13
The origins of Rule 11 can be traced back to English common law.
The requirement that counsel sign pleadings dates from "English equity
practice at the time of Sir Thomas More."' 4 The original intent of the
signature requirement was to ensure the proper form of pleadings.'- This
practice was adopted in the United States through the assimilation of
English common law. Abuse of judicial process was addressed in the
United States as early as 1813, when Congress adopted legislation pro-
viding that attorneys who "multiplied the proceedings in any cause
before the court so as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously"
could be held liable for "any excess of costs so incurred.", 6
9. See infra part III.D.
10. See infra notes 246-76 and accompanying text.
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. For the complete text of Rule 11 including the 1983 amendment,
see infra note 38.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
13. Id.
14. Jerold S. Solovy et al., Sanctions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, in RULE 11
AND OTHER SANCTIONS: NEw ISSUES IN FEDERAL LITIGATION 9, 15 (1987).
15. Id. at 15; see Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some
"Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J.
1313, 1315 (1986); D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some
"Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REv. 1, 8-14 (1976).
16. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759 (1980) (quoting Act of July 22,
1813, ch. 14, § 3, 3 Stat. 21 (1854)); William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal
Rule 11-A CloserLook, 104 F.R.D. 181, 182 (1985) (quoting Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,
447 U.S. 752, 759 (1980)).
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Rule 24 of the Federal Equity Rules of 184217 was developed to
ensure that there was "good ground" for the suit," requiring that every
bill contain counsel's signature as an "affirmation" that there was a rea-
sonable foundation. As a member of the United States Supreme Court at
the time of the rules' adoption, 9 Justice Joseph Story greatly influenced
the development of Rule 24.20 He believed that counsel's signature
served to guarantee that "'there is good ground for the suit in the man-
ner, [sic] in which it is framed.' "21 A later version of the rule, Rule 24 of
the Federal Equity Rules of 1912,22 supplied the foundation for modem
Rule 11.
Rule 11 in its original form was adopted in 1937.23 It abolished the
old equity rule requiring sworn testimony to overcome an answer and a
17. Equity Rule 24 provided: "Every bill shall contain the signature of counsel annexed to
it, which shall be considered as an affirmation on his part that, upon the instructions given to
him and the case laid before him, there is good ground for the suit, in the manner in which it is
framed." Equity R. 24, 42 U.S. (1 How.) xlviii (1842), quoted in JAMES L. HOPKINS, Hop-
KINS' NEw FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 86-87 (6th ed. 1929).
18. Id.
19. Justice Joseph Story served on the Supreme Court from 1811 to 1845. THE WORLD
ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FAcTS: 1991, at 89 (1990).
20. Risinger, supra note 15, at 13.
21. Solovy et al., supra note 14, at 16 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS § 47
(1838)).
22. 226 U.S. 655 (1912). Rule 24 of the Equity Rules of 1912 provided:
Every bill or other pleading shall be signed individually by one or more solicitors of
record, and such signatures shall be considered as a certificate by each solicitor that
he has read the pleading so signed by him; that upon the instructions laid before him
regarding the case there is good ground for the same; that no scandalous matter is
inserted in the pleading; and that it is not interposed for delay.
Id.
23. Prior to the 1983 amendment, Rule 11 provided:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party
who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address.
Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be
verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an
answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that
it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to
defeat the purpose of this rule; it may be stricken as sham and false and the action
may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a wilful violation of
this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar
action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 11 (1960).
The Rules Enabling Act authorized the United States Supreme Court to prescribe general
rules of civil procedure for the district courts and courts of appeals of the United States. 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1988). Before the rules and amendments to the rules take effect, two proce-
dures must be met. The rules: (1) must be reported to Congress by the Chief Justice at or after
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verifying affidavit to support any pleading.24 The original federal rules
were adopted by order of the Supreme Court on December 20, 193725
pursuant to the Act of June 19, 1934.26 The Attorney General transmit-
ted the rules to Congress on January 3, 193827 and they became effective
on September 16, 1938.28 The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (Advisory Committee) 29 commented that Rule 11
substantially conformed to Equity Rule 24 relating to signature of coun-
sel30 and Equity Rule 2131 relating to scandalous matters.32 Rule 11 was
designed to replace the equity code's major reliance on party verification
by affidavit "as the central mechanism for obtaining honesty in pleading
with central reliance on attorney good faith."' 33 The attorney's signature
on the pleading represented to the court that he or she had read the
pleading and that to the best of the attorney's knowledge there was
"good ground" for the suit. 4 The rule offered parties some protection
the beginning of a regular session of Congress; and (2) shall not take effect until ninety days
after they have been reported. Id. See infra note 38 for a discussion of the procedure used in
amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1983.
24. The original Rule 11 abolished the need for a verifying affidavit, providing that
"[e]xcept when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified
or accompanied by affidavit." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 11 (1960).
25. 308 U.S. 645, 647 (1938); H.R. EXEC. COMM. REP. No. 905, 83 CONG. REc., 75th
Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 13 (1938); FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL-APPELLATE-CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE 7 (aw sch. ed., West 1978).
26. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ 1-2, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1988)); see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
27. 308 U.S. 645, 647 (1938); H.R. EXEC. COMM. REP. No. 905, 83 CONG. REC., 75th
Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 13 (1938).
28. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL-APPELLATE-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 23, at 7.
29. See infra note 38 for an explanation of the Advisory Committee's role in revising the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
30. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
31. Equity Rule 21 provided: "Scandal and Impertinence. The right to except to bills,
answers, and other proceedings for scandal or impertinence shall not obtain, but the court
may, upon motion or its own initiative, order any redundant, impertinent or scandalous matter
stricken out, upon such terms as the court shall think fit." Equity R. 21, 226 U.S. 655 (1912).
32. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 11 (1960).
But see Risinger, supra note 15, at 8-9 n.20 (suggesting Equity Rule 21 provided for in Rule
12(0, not Rule 11).
Rule 11 replaced the Equity Rule 24 requirement that the attorney's signature represented
that he or she had read the pleading and there was good gound for the same-that the pleading
was not interposed for delay. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 28
U.S.C.A. Rule 11 (1960); see supra note 22. Rule 11 combined the signing requirements set
out in Equity Rule 24 with the court's ability to strike scandalous or impertinent pleadings
provided for in Equity Rule 21. Equity R. 21, 226 U.S. 655 (1912). See supra notes 22, 31 for
the text of the equity rules.
33. Risinger, supra note 15, at 7.
34. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 11 (1960).
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against frivolous or bad faith litigation.35 Nevertheless, it did not alter
the American rule that "the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled
to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser."36 Rule 11 remained
unchanged until its amendment in 1983. 37
B. Rule 11: The 1983 Amendment
In 1983 Congress amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure38 to encourage courts to impose sanctions "by emphasizing
the responsibilities of the attorney and reenforcing those obligations by
35. Rule 11, prior to the 1983 amendment, provided that if a pleading were interposed for
delay or were signed with intent to "defeat the purpose of this rule," the court could strike the
pleading, or subject the attorney to "appropriate disciplinary action." Id.
36. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2462 (1990) (quoting Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)).
At the time of the publication of this Note, the Advisory Committee proposed a new
amendment to Rule 11 to remedy problems discussed in this Note. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY
DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (August, 1991).
37. Solovy et al., supra note 14, at 16.
38. The following text shows the effect of the 1983 amendment (italics show additions,
brackets show deletions):
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Sanctions: Every plead-
ing, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by
at least one attorney of record in [his] the attorney's individual name, whose address
shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign [his] the
party's pleading motion, or other paper and state [his] the party's address. Except
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified
or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness
sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney
orparty constitutes a certificate by [him] the signer that [he] the signer has read the
pleading motion, or other paper; that to the best of [his] the signer's knowledge,
information, and belief [there is good ground to support it; and that it is not inter-
posed for delay] formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If
a pleading, motion, or otherpaper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed
promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. [or is
signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and
false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a
wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary
action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.] If
a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation or this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a repre-
sented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to
the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. CIv. P. II advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 196-97 (1983) (altering advisory
committee's note to show gender neutralization used in the amended Rule); 2A JAMES MOORE
& Jo D. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11.01[3] (2d ed. 1991). Compare FED. R.
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the imposition of sanctions." 9 The amendment was intended to expand
the equitable doctrine that allows courts to award expenses "to a litigant
whose opponent acted in bad faith in bringing suit or conducting litiga-
tion."'' Specifically, Congress changed Rule 11 from permissive-upon
finding a violation a court may subject an attorney to disciplinary ac-
Civ. P. 11 with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 11 (1960) (showing effect of gender
neutralization).
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure circulated a draft of a
revision of Rule 11 in June 1981 to the bench, bar and public. Public hearings were held in
Washington D.C. and Los Angeles in 1981. After evaluating reactions to the proposed amend-
ment, the Advisory Committee made their formal recommendation for the revision of Rule 11
to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. app. C at 190-92.
The Standing Committee submitted the revision to the Supreme Court for its acceptance. The
Supreme Court's advisory committee submitted the final draft on March 9, 1982. William F.
Harvey, The Judicial Assault on the Attorney-Client Relationship: Thoughts on the 1983
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I BENCHMARKS 17, 17 (1984).
39. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. at 198.
The district courts have discretion to fashion an "appropriate sanction." As well as im-
posing attorney's fees, courts have suspended the offending attorneys from practice in the dis-
trict court unless they could show why a Rule 11 sanction motion should not be granted. See
Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 1985). Courts have also imposed the
sanction of dismissal. See Consolidated Equip. Corp. v. Associates Commercial Corp., 40 Fed.
R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1432, 1433 (D. Mass. 1985); see also In re Disciplinary Action Curl,
803 F.2d 1004, 1005 (9th Cir. 1986) (approving suspension or disbarment from practice for
future negligence), overruled on other grounds by Partington v. Gedan, 923 F.2d 686 (1991) (en
bane); Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 1986) (appropriate sanctions may
include imposition of only part of adversary's expense, reprimand or reference to bar associa-
tion grievance committee); Davis v. Veslan Enters., 765 F.2d 494, 500-01 (5th Cir. 1985) (sanc-
tion may include award of amount of accrued interest lost because of delay in entering state
court judgment); Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F. Supp.
1519, 1522-23 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (requiring sanctioned attorney to circulate court's opinion
finding violation of Rule 11 to every member of firm), aff'd, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986).
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. at 198. The Supreme Court
in Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991), found that the sanction scheme under the
federal rules did not "displace[] the inherent power to impose sanctions for ... bad-faith
conduct." Id. at 2134. Courts have the inherent power "to fashion an appropriate sanction
for conduct which abuses the judicial process." Id. at 2133.
Sanctions that courts have imposed for abusing the judicial process include dismissal and
attorney's fees. See, ag., Anderson v. United Parcel Serv., 915 F.2d 313, 315-16 (7th Cir.
1990) (dismissing plaintiff's action after delay and failure to comply with judge's order justi-
fied); Hilton Hotels v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40, 43-44 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (awarding attorney's fees to
deter future abuse of litigation process justified); Ayers v. Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 1270 (9th
Cir. 1990) (awarding fees to opposing side justified because of failure to appear at settlement
conference). Although dismissal is particularly severe, courts have the discretion to dismiss
cases for abusing the judicial process. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765
(1980) (recognizing court's power to dismiss where party abuses judicial process). Courts also
have the inherent power to assess attorney's fees against a party or counsel. Chambers, I11 S.
Ct. at 2133; Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 765; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14
(1978); see also Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1557 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (court
has inherent power to impose reasonable and appropriate sanctions upon counsel for abusive
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tion 41-to mandatory-upon finding a violation a court shall impose an
appropriate sanction.42 This amendment also altered the Rule 11 stan-
dard from subjective, requiring both an "intent to defeat the purposes of
this rule"43 and a "wilful violation of this rule,"' to objective, requiring
merely a finding of unreasonableness under the circumstances before
sanctions will be ordered.45 The Advisory Committee stressed that the
"shall impose" language of the amendment to Rule 11 should "focus the
court's attention on the need to impose sanctions for pleading and mo-
tion abuses."" The Advisory Committee further commented that the
litigation practices including dismissal with prejudice, entry of default judgment and monetary
sanction).
The Court in Chambers outlined three areas where federal courts have the inherent power
to assess attorney's fees against counsel. The first area, known as "common fund exception"
derives from a court's historic equity jurisdiction, Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2133, allowing a
court "to award attorney's fees to a party whose litigation efforts directly benefit others." Id.;
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-58 (1975).
Second, a court may sanction a party by requiring the party to pay attorney's fees for "the
willful disobedience of a court order ... as part of the fine to be levied on the defendant."
Chambers, I11 S. Ct. at 2133 (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240, 258 (1975) (quoting Fleishman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714,
718 (1967)); Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923)).
Third, a court has the inherent power to impose sanctions when the losing party has
"acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co., 421 U.S. at 258-59 (quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex reL Indus. Lumber Co.,
417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)). Bad faith may include "delaying or disrupting litigation or hamper-
ing the enforcement of a court order." Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2133 (quoting Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1978)).
41. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 11 (1960); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory commit-
tee's note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 197 (1983). See supra note 23 for the text of Rule 11 prior to its
amendment.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Courts have interpreted the amended Rule as being mandatory
when it appears that a pleading or motion has been interposed for an improper purpose, is not
well grounded in fact, or is not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification or reversal of existing law. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New
York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985). The court in Eastway determined that the "drafters
intended to stress the mandatory nature of the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the rule."
Id. at 254 n.7.
43. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 11 (1960).
44. Id.
45. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. at 198-99. The Advisory
Committee stated that the standard to apply when reviewing an attorney's conduct was "rea-
sonableness under the circumstances." Id. at 198. The Advisory Committee further ex-
plained that a court should "avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test the signer's
conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or other
paper was submitted." Id. at 199. The Rule itself states that the attorney's signature certifies
that the attorney made a "reasonable inquiry." FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Once a court determines
that an attorney or party has not acted in an objectively reasonable manner and has violated
the Rule, sanctions are mandatory. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D.
at 200.
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. at 200.
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standard was "more stringent than the original good-faith formula"47
and would trigger a violation of the Rule in a greater range of circum-
stances.48 Nevertheless, the amended Rule was not intended to be a fee-
shifting statute4 9 and "[a] movant under Rule 11 has no entitlement to
fees or any other sanction."50 Today, a court's inquiry involves objec-
tively evaluating whether the filing was frivolous and whether the com-
plaint was filed for an improper purpose.5
Congress explicitly sought to reverse the judiciary's traditional re-
luctance to intervene and impose sanctions on its own motion. To this
end, the Advisory Committee stated that "[t]he detection and punish-
ment of a violation of the signing requirement, encouraged by the
amended rule, is part of the court's responsibility for securing the sys-
tem's effective operation.",5 2  The Advisory Committee intended the
amendment of Rule 11 to minimize the frivolous signing of pleadings,
motions and other papers by requiring courts to impose sanctions for
violation of Rule 11 standards. 3 It also wrote that "[m]andating sanc-
tions, such as expenses, upon the violator is viewed as a healthy deterrent
against costly meritless maneuvers and worth the risk of satellite
litigation."
'5 4
Rule 11 allows a court to impose "an appropriate sanction" either
on its own motion or on the motion of a party.55 The Rule specifies one
potential "appropriate sanction" as "an order to pay to the other party
.. the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing
of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's
47. Id. at 198-99.
48. Id.
49. STEPHEN B. BURBANK, AMERICAN JUDICATURE Soc'Y, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION:
THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 49 (1989).
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990). Rule 11 requires an
attorney to inquire into the facts to make sure the pleading is well grounded in fact, i.e., not
frivolous, and is not "interposed for any improper purpose." FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 200 (1983).
53. Letter from Walter R. Mansfield, Chairman, to Judge Edward T. Gignoux, Chairman,
and Members of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Mar. 9, 1982),
in FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. app. C at 192.
54. Id. Satellite litigation is litigation unrelated to the merits of the case before the court,
dealing with the collateral issue of sanctions such as the hearing and appeal of sanction mo-
tions and decisions.
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
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fee." 6 The Advisory Committee commented that a court "has discre-
tion to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case."57
1. Policy arguments favoring amended Rule 11
Congress intended amended Rule 11 to decrease the number of friv-
olous claims brought before the courts, thus allowing the judicial system
to operate more efficiently.58 Proponents of the amended Rule believe
practices such as filing frivolous complaints, harassing one's opponent
and maintaining baseless defenses have contributed to the problem of ex-
pensive, complex and burdensome civil litigation.59 They suggest that
implementing the amended Rule would decrease such delays.' Simi-
larly, the Advisory Committee commented that the purpose behind the
amendment's adoption was to "discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and
help to streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or
defenses."61 The Advisory Committee intended to provide for the "de-
tection and punishment of a violation of the signing requirement" to en-
able the system to operate effectively.62 Proponents of the amendment
claim that the prior tools to deter and punish the abuse of the judicial
system were inadequate, and that a more effective Rule was necessary.
63
The amendment was meant to solve some of the old Rule's
problems. Prior to amendment, Rule 11 did not impose mandatory sanc-
tions for a misuse of the judicial system."4 Lawyers were reluctant to
request and judges were reluctant to grant sanctions against other attor-
neys because: (1) the process is unpleasant and creates antagonism
56. Id.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. at 200.
58. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990); see also William W.
Schwarzer, Pro, 7 COMPLEAT LAWYER 27, 27-29 (1990) (Rule 11 intended to prevent frivo-
lous litigation abuse and harrassment); Schwarzer, supra note 16, at 183 (Rule 11 intended to
deter misuse or abuse of litigation process); FED. PROCEDURE COMM'N, AM. BAR ASS'N,
SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS 9 (Edna S. Epstein et al. eds., 1986) (Rule 11
intended to prevent unnecessary work by court or litigants).
59. Schwarzer, supra note 16, at 182; Schwarzer, supra note 58, at 27.
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. at 198 (amended Rule to
discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help "streamline" litigation); Schwarzer, supra note
58, at 28.
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. at 198.
62. Id. at 200.
63. Id. at 198; see also Schwarzer, supra note 16, at 182-84 (tools to deter and punish
abuse of justice system inadequate prior to amended Rule).
64. See infra note 231 for the text of Rule 11 prior to amendment. Prior to amendment,
Rule 11 provided that an attorney "may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action," Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 11 (1960) (emphasis added), leaving the decision whether to
grant the motion for sanctions within the discretion of the trial court. See supra notes 41-45
and accompanying text; see infra note 187 and accompanying text.
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among members of the bar;65 (2) lawyers may not want to call attention
to practices they themselves use;66 (3) judges do not want to appear as
policemen, teachers or moral guardians; 67 and (4) judges do not want to
appear as if they are imposing their own standards of professional con-
duct on others. 8 Making sanctions mandatory under the amended Rule
relieves some of the tension present in what were previously discretionary
awards. Proponents claim that the advantages of punishing and deter-
ring abuses outweigh the uncomfortable nature of attorneys moving for
sanctions and judges granting sanction motions.69 The amended Rule
allows district courts to better regulate conduct that reflects poorly on
the profession, and to deter such misbehavior by consistently imposing
sanctions. 70
Proponents of the amended Rule counter criticisms that it will chill
zealous advocacy by pointing out that it does not "alter the adversary
system or diminish the lawyer's obligation to his client." 7 1 Additionally,
there are disciplinary rules imposing limits on zealous advocacy dating
back to 1908.72 Supporters also argue that there are necessary limits to
65. Schwarzer, supra note 16, at 183.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 184.
69. Id.
70. FED. PROCEDURE COMM'N, supra note 58, at 3; A. Leo Levin & Sylvan A. Sobel,
Achieving Balance in the Developing Law of Sanctions, 36 CATH. L. REV. 587, 589 (1987)
(courts taking balanced approach towards sanctions, providing corrective measures to litiga-
tion problems and avoiding negative side effects).
71. Schwarzer, supra note 16, at 189.
72. ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 30 (1908) (as amended, the Opinions of
the ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics), reprinted in VERN COUNTRYMAN ET AL., THE
LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY app. ii, at 942 (2d ed. 1976) (prohibiting attorney from con-
ducting civil action or making defense when convinced that it is intended merely to harass or
injure opposite party or work oppression or wrong); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1
(1983). Model Code DR 7-102(A)(1) and (A)(2) mandate:
Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law.
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other
action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing
law, except that he may advance such claim or defense it if [sic] can be supported by
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A).
Model Rule 3.1 provides in pertinent part: "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceed-
ing, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1.
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litigation, and that judges will not unfairly punish frivolous litigation
through the use of Rule I1.7
2. Policy arguments criticizing amended Rule 11
Critics of the 1983 amendment argue that it encourages satellite liti-
gation, shifts the economic burden of litigation and prolongs litigation.74
The new freedom trial courts have in imposing sanctions may increase
the number of motions for Rule 11 sanctions, which in turn may en-
courage opposing counsel to file Rule 11 motions for the frivolous filing
of the original Rule 11 motion.7 5 Motions for Rule 11 sanctions cause
additional cost and time expenditures,76 require notice to the court,
77
possibly involve discovery, 78 require an opportunity to oppose the impo-
sition of sanctions79 and a separate hearing on the matter,8" and may lead
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983); Schwarzer,
supra note 16, at 184; Levin & Sobel, supra note 70, at 589-91.
74. Judy L. Woods, Comment, Reasonable Inquiry Under Rule 11-Is the Stop, Look, and
Investigate Requirement a Litigant's Roadblock?, 18 IND. L. REv. 751, 772 (1985).
75. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. Even proponent William Schwarzer
comments that "l]awyers have tended to move for sanctions much more frequently than is
justified or desirable." Schwarzer, supra note 58, at 29.
76. Woods, supra note 74, at 772.
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. at 200; Tom Growney
Equip. v. Shelley Irrigation Dev., 834 F.2d 833, 835-37 (9th Cir. 1987) (procedural due process
requiring fair notice for Rule 11 sanctions).
78. The Advisory Committee's note suggests that "discovery should be conducted only by
leave of the court, and then only in extraordinary circumstances." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advi-
sory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. at 201. Opponents state that often large sanctions are im-
posed without discovery or an evidentiary hearing, preventing the sanctioned attorney from
receiving due process. Jerold S. Solovy, Con, 7 COMPLEAT LAWYER 27, 30 (1990).
79. Schwarzer, supra note 16, at 198.
80. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980) ("Like other sanctions, at-
torney's fees certainly should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice and an opportunity
for a hearing on the record."); White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 686 (10th Cir.
1990) ("A party that is the target of a sanctions request has a due process right to 'notice that
such sanctions are being considered by the court and a subsequent opportunity to respond,'
before final judgment." (citing Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1514 (10th Cir. 1987))),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 788 (1991); Davis v. Crush, 862 F.2d 84, 88-89 (6th Cir. 1988) (when
case dismissed without trial, due process may require hearing before Rule 11 sanctions may be
imposed); Tom Growney Equip., 834 F.2d at 835-37 (imposition of Rule 11 sanctions without
fair notice and opportunity to be heard violates procedural due process); Donaldson v. Clark,
819 F.2d 1551, 1558-61 (11th Cir. 1987) (existence of Rule 11 is notice enough for factual
deficiency, notice required for pleading requesting extension of existing law or for pleading
found to be interposed for improper purpose); Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald Corp. v.
Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 540 (3d Cir. 1985) (due process requires fair notice and opportunity
for hearing on record); Woods, supra note 74, at 772 (requests for Rule 11 sanctions requiring
notice and hearing).
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to an appeal of the sanction decision." Thus, although the Advisory
Committee suggests that the amended Rule is meant to "streamline the
litigation process," 2 opponents of Rule 11 strongly suggest that the
amendment has done just the opposite.83 In fact, one opponent claims
that "satellite litigation has become a fact of life under Rule 11 ....
Undoubtedly in this new decade, every case will involve some form of
Rule 11 motion and resulting decision."84 Not only does the amended
Rule cause more motions for sanctions, but the mandatory nature of
sanctions once a violation is found also sparks more appeals of sanction
orders.85 Courts have further held that motions requesting sanctions can
81. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2456 (1990) (imposition of Rule 11
sanctions requires determination of collateral issue and may be made after principal suit has
been terminated); DeSisto College Inc. v. Line, 888 F.2d 755 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (court of appeals
has jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal from decision awarding Rule 11 sanctions under
"collateral order" doctrine), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2219 (1990); Lupo v. R. Rowland & Co.,
857 F.2d 482, 485 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding Rule 11 motion collateral and independent claim),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1081 (1989); Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald Corp., 775 F.2d at 537,
539 (Rule I 1 sanction order reviewable if- (1) order conclusively determines disputed ques-
tion; (2) resolves important issue completely separate from merits of action; and (3) is effec-
tively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment) (Rule 11 sanction order appealable as
collateral order); Knorr Brake Corp. v. Harbil, Inc., 738 F.2d 223, 226 (7th Cir. 1984) (award
of attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 appealable collateral order). But see Riverhead Say.
Bank v. National Mortgage & Equity Corp., 893 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1990) (sanctions
generally not appealable against party prior to entry of final judgment, but sanction order
against non-party immediately appealable as final order).
82. FED. R CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. at 198.
83. Arthur B. LaFrance, Federal Rule 11 and Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAL. U. L.
REv. 331, 334 (1988); Nelken, supra note 15, at 1325-29; Risinger, supra note 15, at 34. Risin-
ger points out that there were few instances between 1938 and 1983 when sanctions were
imposed or requested. However, after the 1983 amendment, in the first two years alone, there
were 200 reported cases under Rule 11. Nelken analyzes some of these cases in considerable
detail. Nelken, supra note 15, at 1325-29.
84. Solovy, supra note 78, at 27. Solovy reports that more than one thousand reported
Rule 11 decisions have been handed down as well as undoubtedly hundreds, if not thousands,
of unreported Rule 11 decisions. Id.
85. Id. at 30. Solovy argues that because of the stigma attached to being sanctioned,
"counsel must appeal the decision to protect his or her reputation." Id.
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form the basis for Rule 11 sanctions;8 6 satellite litigation can reach ridic-
ulous lengths.8 7
Some members of the practicing bar criticize the amended Rule for
increasing the imposition of sanctions, which in turn deters vigorous ad-
vocacy."" According to these opponents, zealous advocacy without con-
cern for possible misrepresentations to the court is "the hallmark of
aggressive and justified representation of the client."89 Although the Ad-
visory Committee suggests that Rule 11 is "not intended to chill an attor-
ney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories,"9 0
courts have imposed substantial personal sanctions upon attorneys in-
volving awards of hundreds of thousands of dollars9 and even a million
dollars.92 One attorney argued that "sanctions of this magnitude chill,
and probably kill, a lawyer's ardor and enthusiasm for forging new legal
86. E.g., Local 106, Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. Homewood Memorial Gardens, 838
F.2d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming trial court's ruling that union's motion for sanctions
showed complete disregard for existing law supporting Homewood's defense and sanction-
able); In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1074 (7th Cir. 1987) (excessive request for
fees sanctionable event; district courts should try to impose sanctions for each independently
sanctionable event); Harris v. WGN Continental Broadcasting, 650 F. Supp. 568, 576 (N.D.
Ill. 1986) (claim of violation of Rule 11 serious charge and can itself form basis for Rule 11
sanctions); Cobur Optical Indus! v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656, 661 (M.D.N.C. 1985)
(sanctioning attorney who moved for Rule 11 sanctions in response to opposing counsel's mo-
tion for sanctions); Fisher Bros. v. Cambridge-Lee Indus., 585 F. Supp. 69, 72 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(imposing sanctions against moving party of Rule 11 motion). See generally Susan Getzendan-
ner, Current Issues and Rule 11, in 1 CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE,
415, 439 (October 17, 1988) (discussing increase in number of frivolous sanction requests and
sanction requests on sanction motions).
87. E.g., Stevens v. Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 1056, 1060-61 (4th Cir. 1986)
(former client appealed denial of motion for sanctions against insurer for insurer's filing of
motion for sanctions against former client's counsel); see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
88. Solovy, supra note 78, at 27; Woods, supra note 74, at 770.
89. Solovy et al., supra note 14, at 8.
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983).
91. Solovy, supra note 78, at 27. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a district
court sanction of $172,382 against plaintiffs and their attorneys, jointly and severally, includ-
ing local counsel in Kansas, and remanded for further findings on the reasonableness of the
attorney's fees. White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 686-87 (10th Cir. 1990). The
court said the test for the amount of the sanction "should be the least severe sanction adequate
to deter and punish the plaintiff," and should not be used to drive "certain attorneys out of
practice." Id. at 684.
92. The United States district court in Miami imposed a $1.2 million dollar sanction
against the Washington D.C. based public interest law firm Christic Institute, Avirgan v. Hull,
705 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989), aff'd, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991), which might put the
firm out of business. Paul Marcotte, Rule 11 Revisited, 75 A.B.A. J. 32, 34 (1989). A spokes-
man for the firm commented that if the case is upheld, other public interest groups will be
deterred from getting involved in controversial issues for fear of having sanctions imposed
against them. Id.
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frontiers."93 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this fear:
"Vital changes have been wrought by those members of the bar who have
dared to challenge the received wisdom, and a rule that penalized such
innovation and industry would run counter to our notions of the com-
mon law itself."94
Critics also claim that the amended Rule causes conflict in the attor-
ney-client relationship. Proponents of Rule 11 suggest that attorneys
should warn their clients of the Rule.95 Opponents criticize this sugges-
tion as having a "'chilling' effect on the attorney-client relationship" 96
because clients may feel compelled to withhold information in order to
"protect" their attorney.9 7 One commentator points out that an attorney
may no longer be able to rely on a client for factual information,98 be-
cause under the amended Rule's objective standard, an attorney is ex-
pected to make a reasonable inquiry into factual matters, provided the
attorney has a reasonable amount of time between engagement and filing
the complaint, possibly resulting in a higher cost of legal services. 99 Not
being able to rely on the client's initial statement of the facts may cause a
feeling of distrust between the attorney and client."°
The amended Rule may further disrupt the attorney-client relation-
ship: once either the court or opposing counsel proposes Rule 11 sanc-
tions at the pleading stage or later, "Rule 11 can compel the disclosure of
information usually protected by the attorney-client privilege or by work
product immunity." 0 1 One commentator suggests that even if informa-
93. Solovy, supra note 78, at 27.
94. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985). The
Second Circuit noted that, "it is important that Rule 11 not have the effect of chilling creative
advocacy, even of positions that may arguably be at odds with existing precedent." Cross &
Cross Properties, Ltd. v. Everett Allied Co., 886 F.2d 497, 504 (2d Cir. 1989).
95. Solovy, supra note 78, at 29.
96. Woods, supra note 74, at 769.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 763 (citing Richard L. Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential
Impact of the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 66 JUDICATUR B
363, 365 (1983)). For example, if sanctions are raised against an attorney who bases his certifi-
cation entirely upon consultation with officers and employees of a client corporation, an ade-
quate showing could most likely only be made by disclosing the content of such
communications. Id. at 365.
99. Whereas prior to the 1983 amendment, an attorney could file the complaint relying on
the factual information given him or her by the client, the amended Rule requires attorneys to
"stop, think and investigate" more carefully before filing papers. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory
committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 192 (1983).
100. Woods, supra note 74, at 763.
101. Id. at 768; see also LaFrance, supra note 83, at 347 n.64 ("Rule I1 inquiries, because
they arise in the same context as the litigation prompting them, inevitably create attorney-
client conflicts .... [B]ecause Rule I 1 operates independently of whether a party prevails on
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tion protected by the attorney-client privilege or by work product immu-
nity is not disclosed, an attorney may be forced to reveal trial strategy
and preliminary investigative steps at an inopportune time. 102
Also, a court's imposition of sanctions on a lawyer and client creates
a conflict of interest for the attorney. 10 3 The attorney owes a primary
duty to the client."° The American Bar Association Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) recognize that the lawyer has an
ethical obligation to "hold inviolate confidential information of the cli-
ent."105 In order to defend against a possible sanction, the attorney may
feel torn between saving his or her own pocketbook, reputation, and pos-
sibly even license to practice before the federal court, 106 and his or her
duty to protect the attorney-client privilege'
0 7
The Model Rules recognize that a lawyer may reveal information in
some circumstances. Rule 1.6(b)(2) indicates that the attorney might be
able to reveal confidential client information when facing court sanc-
tions.108 Thus, facing Rule 11 sanctions may force an attorney to divulge
case theories and trial strategy at an inopportune time, which may have a
the merits, it strikes uniquely at the attorney's performance and therefore his or her relation-
ship with the client."). But see FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 165,
191 (1983) (Rule 11 not to require disclosure of privileged communications or work product,
however, in camera inspection may be required).
102. Woods, supra note 74, at 678.
103. Solovy, supra note 78, at 29.
104. Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. cmt. 7 (1983) (duty to
be zealous advocate without disclosing confidences usually harmonious with responsibility to
legal system). The preamble to the Model Rules states that "clients are entitled to expect that
communications within the scope of the [attorney-client] privilege will be protected against
compelled disclosure." Id.
105. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 2 (1983).
106. The court in Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Cal. 1985), indicated that
if the attorneys did not show credible information that justified their belief in the allegations in
the complaint, the court would suspend the offending attorneys from practicing in the District
Court of the Northern District of California. Id. at 1172-73; FED. PROCEDURE COMM'N,
supra note 58, at 8.
107. Solovy, supra note 78, at 29. One critic of the amended rules stated that they "sponsor
a direct attack on the attorney and his client, and their relationship." Harvey, supra note 38,
at 21.
108. Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) provides:
A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary:
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between
the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim
against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to re-
spond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the
client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1983).
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prejudicial effect on the client's interests.109 The client and the attorney
may even have to retain separate counsel to oppose a sanction motion or
appeal a sanction order.110 In such situations, it is argued, attorneys and
clients almost certainly will find their attention diverted from the original
matter in dispute."1
Furthermore, critics argue that since ninety-five percent of all civil
cases settle before reaching trial, the beneficial effect of Rule 11 is margi-
nal. 12 Critics suggest that the federal judicial system is already efficient,
and that Rule 11 will not be an effective deterrent for the five percent of
cases that do not settle before trial. 3 They argue that the vast majority
of cases which do reach trial are grounded in fact and law, and brought
in good faith, thus requiring their day in court.'14 Opponents of the
Rule warn that Rule 11 favors the policy of judicial economy for the
benefit of the state, rather than supporting the enforcement of the rights
of individuals. 5 Opponents also point to Rule ll's effect as an in-
creased economic burden to litigation, 6 and suggest that the poor and
middle classes will be particularly harmed. 11
Finally, critics note that whereas the Rule is arguably only margin-
ally useful in deterring litigation, 1 it is extremely detrimental to civil
109. Woods, supra note 74, at 768. But see FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note,
97 F.R.D. 165, 191 (1983) ("Our Advisory Committee Note has ... been amplified to make
clear ... that the rule does not require a party or attorney to disclose privileged communica-
tions or work product."). The Advisory Committee's note states:
The rule does not require a party or an attorney to disclose privileged communica-
tions or work product in order to show that the signing of the pleading, motion, or
other paper is substantially justified. The provisions of Rule 26(c), including appro-
priate orders after in camera inspection by the court, remain available to protect a
party claiming privilege or work product protection.
Id. at 199.
110. Solovy, supra note 78, at 29.
111. Woods, supra note 74, at 769.
112. Id. at 773.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 773-74. See generally LaFrance, supra note 83, at 333-34 (warning that Rule I1
is "antithetical to public interest litigation").
116. See supra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
117. Woods, supra note 74, at 773.
118. LaFrance, supra note 83, at 334 (1983 amendment to Rule I 1 has generated "literally
hundreds of opinions"); see supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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rights issues.119 Startling statistics reveal that civil rights cases are sanc-
tioned far more frequently than other civil cases.
1 20
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Standards of review are "those yardstick phrases meant to guide the
appellate court in approaching the issues and parties before it and the
trial court's earlier procedure or result." 1 21 Standards of review fre-
quently "describe the relevant and appropriate materials the appellate
court looks to in performing its review fumction." 122 Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52 (Rule 52) provides the standard by which appellate
courts must review factual findings in civil actions. 123 Rule 52 provides
for a "clearly erroneous" standard for reviewing factual issues. 124 How-
119. See LaFrance, supra note 83, at 334 (Rule 11 shifts from "fifty years of progress in
individual rights and civil liberties"); Marcotte, supra note 92, at 32 (civil rights plaintiffs
disproportionately affected by Rule 11); Solovy, supra note 78, at 30 ("[S]ting of the rule is
most often directed toward Title VII and civil rights plaintiffs.").
120. See LaFrance, supra note 83, at 353; Solovy, supra note 78, at 30. "Although civil
rights cases constitute less than 8% of case filing in federal court, they amounted to more than
22% of reported Rule I1 cases between 1983 and 1985." LaFrance, supra note 83, at 353. If
the category of "civil rights" cases were expanded to include employment discrimination, and
other relevant categories, these cases would amount to 29.9% of Rule 11 motions, with sanc-
tions granted 68% of the time. Id. at 353. LaFrance points out that Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), would be "particularly
vulnerable" if brought today because of the adverse impact of Rule 11 on public interest litiga-
tion. LaFrance, supra, note 83, at 353-54. Another critic points out that "[c]ivil-rights plain-
tiffs and their counsel were sanctioned at a rate of 47.1% of motions, considerably higher than
the 8.4% for plaintiffs in non-civil-rights cases." Marcotte, supra note 92, at 32.
121. 1 STEVEN A. CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, STANDARDS OF REVIEW: FEDERAL
CIVIL CASES AND REviEW PROCESS § 1.1, at 3 (1986).
122. lid. § 1.1, at 5.
123. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 provides appellate courts with a uniform standard
to apply to factual findings by the trial court. FED. R. Civ. P. 52. The purpose of Rule 52 is:
(I) to avoid continued confusion and conflicts among the circuits as to the standard
of appellate review of findings of fact by the court;
(2) to eliminate the disparity between the standard of review as literally stated in
Rule 52(a) and the practice of some courts of appeals; and
(3) to promote nationwide uniformity.
FED. R. Civ. P. 52 advisory committee's note, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 52 (Supp. 1991); see also
Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary or Undisputed
Evidence, 49 VA. L. REV. 506, 536-37 (1963) (proposing broader or narrower scope of Rule
52(a) review dependent upon type of evidence reviewed).
124. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 provides:
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury,
the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58; and in granting or refus-
ing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact
and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for find-
ings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of
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ever, the discretionary aspect of imposing an appropriate sanction, "as
opposed to findings of fact, [is] not generally reviewed under the clearly
erroneous rule."12 Furthermore, finding the exact dividing line between
findings of fact and findings of law is often problematic. 126 Thus, it may
be difficult for a court to know which standard of review to apply to Rule
11 decisions.
Factual findings by the judge generally are considered as conclusive
as a jury verdict,127 whereas equitable review of legal conclusions has
been broader.1 28 Thus, reviewing a decision involving both factual and
legal conclusions may be difficult. When Congress authorized the
merger of law and equity, the federal rules adopted a single test formu-
lated in Rule 52(a). 129 It states in part, "[flindings of fact.., shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the wit-
nesses."130 Although reviewing a Rule 11 sanction decision may involve
questions of law, fact and trial court discretion in fashioning an appropri-
ate sanction, the United States Supreme Court in Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp. has mandated a uniform abuse of discretion standard
for reviewing all aspects of Rule 11 decisions.1 31 Prior to Cooter & Gell,
the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them,
shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the
close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the
court. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of mo-
tions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41(b).
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may
amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new
trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the
court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has
made in the district court an objection to such findings or has made a motion to
amend them or a motion for judgment.
FED. R. Civ. P. 52.
125. 1 CHILDRESS & DAvis, supra note 121, § 2.2, at 28.
126. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984) (mentioning "vexing
nature" of distinguishing law from fact); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982)
(discussing difficulty in distinguishing factual findings from legal conclusions); 1 CHILDRESS &
DAVIS, supra note 121, § 2.3, at 28-29 (discussing problem distinguishing factual from legal
findings).
127. 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 121, § 2.2, at 27.
128. 1 id.; see also Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 501 ("Rule 52 does not inhibit an appellate
court's power to correct errors of law."); Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 287 (stating Rule 52
does not apply to conclusions of law).
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
130. Id.
131. 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990).
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the circuit courts of appeals were split on the proper standard of review
to apply.
132
A. The "Clearly Erroneous" Standard
Some circuit courts of appeals applied a clearly erroneous standard
of review to Rule 11 decisions involving questions of fact prior to Cooter
& Gell v. Hartmarx Corp."33 The "clearly erroneous" standard of appel-
late review developed out of the difficulty involved in reviewing a deci-
sion made in a nonjury legal action, where the judge in essence replaces
the traditional function of the jury."' The United States Supreme Court
has defined the standard: "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed." 3 ' Under this standard, the district court's fact finding
is generally protected, because a reviewing court is not entitled to reverse
the findings of the trier of fact "simply because it is convinced that it
would have decided the case differently."1" 6 The United States Supreme
Court has stated that Rule 52 "recognizes and rests upon the unique
opportunity afforded the trial court judge to evaluate the credibility of
witnesses and to weigh the evidence.'
137
132. See infra notes 150-58, 169-77 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
134. 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 121, § 2.2, at 27-28. Courts apply the clearly erro-
neous standard of review for factual findings made or adopted by the trial judge. See Falcon
Constr. Co. v. Economy Forms Corp., 805 F.2d 1229, 1232 (5th Cir. 1986) (findings of fact not
overturned unless clearly erroneous; applying rule whether trial judge prepared own findings
of fact or whether trial judge adopted party's findings of fact verbatim) (citing FED. R. Civ. P.
52(a); Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 572 (1985); United States v. El Paso Natu-
ral Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656-57 (1964); Clark v. Mobil Oil Corp., 693 F.2d 500, 501 (5th Cir.
1982)); Kinnett Dairies v. Farrow, 580 F.2d 1260, 1268 n.18 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating clearly
erroneous standard of review applicable to trial court's factual findings whether findings pre-
pared or adopted by judge) (citing Railex Corp. v. Speed Check Co., 457 F.2d 1040, 1042 (5th
Cir.), cerL denied, 409 U.S. 876 (1972); Louis Dreyfus & Cie. v. Panama Canal Co., 298 F.2d
733, 738-39 (5th Cir. 1962)); Jenkins v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 506 F.2d 992, 995 (5th
Cir. 1975) (applying clearly erroneous standard of review for case decided by district court
judge without jury) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 52).
135. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)); Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S.
278, 291 (1960) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948)); Buildex Inc. v. Kason Indus., 849 F.2d 1461, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting Ander-
son v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)); Nickerson v. Commissioner, 700 F.2d 402,
405-06 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948)); Gray v. Commissioner, 561 F.2d 753, 759 n.14 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting Commissioner
v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960)).
136. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573.
137. Inwood Lab. v. Ives Lab., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982).
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B. De Novo Review
Some circuit courts of appeals reviewed sanction decisions involving
questions of law de novo. 13" De novo review may be described as review
without any particular deference to the trial court's decision.1 39 This
standard is used when the issue on appeal substantially concerns
"enough law [as opposed to fact] that free review is warranted.""'1 De
novo review does not necessarily mean that the appellate court will
search the entire record, but rather only that portion of the record rele-
vant to the legal issues involved."4' The appellate court makes an in-
dependent conclusion based on the record, using "only those portions of
the record relevant to the legal issue."' 42 The reviewing court is given
the power, ability and competence to come to a different conclusion
based on the record. 143 Although critics argue that the standard allows
too much discretion to the reviewing court, the vast majority of cases on
appeal are affirmed."4
C. The Abuse of Discretion Standard
Prior to Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. ,145 circuit courts of ap-
peals consistently applied an abuse of discretion standard to the question
of whether the sanction imposed was appropriate.' 46 However, the cir-
cuit courts of appeals were split on whether to apply the standard to the
merits of a Rule 11 sanction decision or only to a review of the actual
sanction imposed.'47 The United States Supreme Court in Cooter & Gell
138. See infra notes 169-79 and accompanying text.
139. United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990) ("In de novo review, the
appellate court must review the record in light of its own judgment without giving special
weight to the prior decision."); Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1464 (10th
Cir. 1988) (A court "should make an independent determination of the issues... ; [it] 'is not
to give any special weight to the [prior] determination.'" (quoting United States v. First City
Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967))). See generally 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 121,
§ 2.14, at 76 (discussing definition and role of de novo review of trials).
140. 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 121, § 2.14, at 76.
141. 1 id.
142. 1 id. § 2.14, at 76-77.
143. Brian N., 900 F.2d at 220 (appellate court reviewing record using own independent
judgment without giving special weight to prior decision); see also 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS,
supra note 121, § 2.14, at 76-77 (discussing degree of deference trial court uses in de novo
review as "no particular deference").
144. 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 121, § 2.14, at 77. In 1982 there was an approxi-
mate 80% affirmance average in the circuits for civil appeals. Id. at 77 n.58 (citing W. STU-
ART DORNETrE & ROBERT R. CRoss, FEDERAL JUDICIARY ALMANAC 10 (1984)).
145. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
146. See infra notes 150-58, 169-80 and accompanying text.
147. D. Lee Decker, Note, Appellate Review of Rule 11 Issues-De Novo or Abuse of Discre-
tion? Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc., 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 877, 896-97 (arguing for
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imposed a uniform abuse of discretion standard of review for reviewing
all aspects of a Rule 11 decision.
148
When an appellate court uses an abuse of discretion standard, it
"grants the district court wide leeway in its determination of all is-
sues."' 149 The First,5 0 Third,151 Fourth, 5 2 1Fifth,
153 Sixth, 1 54 Seventh,155
Tenth15 6 and Federal Circuits 5 7 have rather consistently applied an
abuse of discretion standard of review in Rule 11 cases. 158 The standard
has often been compared with reasonableness. 159  In reviewing a trial
court decision, the appellate court decides not whether it would have
made the same decision, but rather whether the trial court abused its
discretion in making the decision."6 The appellate court may find that
uniform flexible abuse of discretion standard); see infra notes 150-58, 169-80 and accompany-
ing text.
148. 110 S. Ct. at 2461.
149. Christopher A. Considine, Comment, Rule 11: Conflicting Appellate Standards of Re-
view and a Proposed Uniform Approach, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 727, 734-37 (1990); see Kasper
v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 814 F.2d 332, 339 (7th Cir. 1987).
150. E.g., Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 861 F.2d 746, 757-58 (1st Cir. 1988)
(stating abuse of discretion standard should be used for all aspects of district court's Rule 11
determination); EBI, Inc. v. Gator Indus., 807 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1986) (applying abuse of
discretion standard of review).
151. E.g., Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 195 (3d Cir.
1988) (recognizing "abuse of discretion" standard for reviewing initial decision to impose sanc-
tions as well as specifics of fee awards).
152. E.g., Introcaso v. Cunningham, 857 F.2d 965, 969 (4th Cir. 1988) (not disturbing
district court's decision to impose sanctions except for abuse of discretion).
153. E.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 872 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane)
(adopting abuse of discretion standard across-the-board to all issues in Rule 11 cases).
154. E.g., Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332, 337 (6th Cir. 1988) (selection of
sanction lies within district courts' sound exercise of discretion).
155. See, e.g., Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank, 880 F.2d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 1989) (en
banc) (adopting uniform deferential standard to achieve harmony within circuit); R.K. Harp
Inv. Corp. v. McQuade, 825 F.2d 1101, 1103 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding Rule 11 decision revers-
ible only where there has been abuse of discretion).
156. E.g., Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 673 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying abuse of dis-
cretion standard "across the board" to all Rule 11 issues); Burkhart Through Meeks v. Kinsley
Barik, 852 F.2d 512, 515 (10th Cir. 1988) (Tenth Circuit "committed to 'abuse of discretion'
standard"); Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1986) (district court's imposition
of sanction under Rule 11 subject to review under abuse of discretion standard).
157. Considine, supra note 149, at 734-35; see, e.g., Everpure, Inc. v. Cuno, Inc., 875 F.2d
300, 304 (Fed. Cir.) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying request for Rule 11 sanctions),
cert denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989).
158. Considine, supra note 149, at 734.
159. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 192, 198-99 (1983).
160. Kasper v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 814 F.2d 332, 339 (7th Cir. 1987) (" 'Abuse of
discretion' means a serious error of judgment, such as reliance on a forbidden factor or failure
to consider an essential factor."); Jaimez-Fevolla v. Bell, 598 F.2d 243, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
("Abuse of discretion may be found 'only if there is no evidence to support the decision or if
the decision is based on an improper understanding of the law.'" (quoting Song Jook Sun v.
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the trial court has abused its discretion "when the judicial action is arbi-
trary, fanciful or unreasonable." '161 In general, the abuse of discretion
standard is meant to prevent the appellate court from second-guessing
the trial court. 62 Exactly how much deference the appellate court gives
the trial court depends on the facts of the individual case and the issues
involved.
163
D. The Three-Tiered Approach
In reviewing an imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, the appellate court
is faced with three separate issues: (1) "factual questions regarding the
nature of the attorney's prefiling inquiry and the factual basis of the
pleading or other paper"; 164 (2) legal issues in determining "whether a
pleading is 'warranted by existing law or a good faith argument' for
changing the law and whether the attorney's conduct violated Rule
11"; 165 and (3) whether the district court "tailor[ed] an 'appropriate
sanction.' 166 Counsel for the petitioners in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Rosenberg, 437 F.2d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 1971))); see also 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note
121, § 4.1, at 228 (applying abuse of discretion to questions of trial judge overreaching, such as
considering wrong factors in applying discretion or exercising such poor discretion appellate
court compelled to reject trial judge's choice).
161. Delno v. Market Street Ry., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942) (abuse of discretion
review in context of refusal to grant declaratory relief). The court in Delno explained abuse of
discretion as the following: "Discretion is abused only where no reasonable man would take
the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the
action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion."
Id.
162. Kasper, 814 F.2d at 339 (reviewing court may substitute its own judgment only if
confident that lower court decision is quirky); see also I CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 121,
§ 4.21, at 289-90 (abuse of discretion standard meant to insulate trial judge decision from
second-guessing by appellate court).
163. See In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1226 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating abuse of
discretion standard most appropriate for flexible review); Abrams v. Interco, Inc., 719 F.2d 23,
28 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating abuse of discretion standard flexible); United States v. Criden, 648
F.2d 814, 817 (3d Cir. 1981) (although review standard designated as abuse of discretion,
scope of review directly related to reason why category or type of decision is committed to trial
court's discretion in first place); 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 121, § 4.10, at 256 (stating
each application of abuse of discretion standard depends on factors and issues reviewed). The
court in Abrams explained the differing amount of deference due the trial court based on the
type of decision reviewed. The court stated that "abuse of discretion is found far more readily
on appeals from a denial or grant of class action status than where the issue is, for example, the
curtailment of cross-examination or the grant or denial of a continuance." Abrams, 719 F.2d
at 28.
164. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2457 (1990) (quoting FED. R. CIv.
P. 11).
165. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 11).
166. Id (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 11).
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Corp. 167 proposed an approach whereby the appeals court would review
findings of law under a de novo standard, findings of fact under a clearly
erroneous standard, and the choice of sanction under an abuse of discre-
tion standard.
16 8
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Cooter & Gell, the Eighth1
69
and Ninth 170 Circuits used this three-tiered approach when reviewing
Rule 11 decisions. 71 For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied a three-tiered approach in Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles." 2 The
court recognized the number of inquiries required in reviewing an impo-
sition of sanctions, and decided that the factual determinations should be
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, the legal conclusion under
a de novo standard, and the sanction imposed under an abuse of discre-
tion standard.
1 73
167. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
168. Id. at 2457-58.
169. E.g., EEOC v. Milavetz & Assocs., P.A., 863 F.2d 613, 614 (8th Cir. 1988); Kurkow-
ski v. Volcker, 819 F.2d 201, 203 n.8 (8th Cir. 1987).
170. E.g., In re Taylor, 884 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1989); Community Elec. Serv. of Los
Angeles, Inc. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 869 F.2d 1235, 1241-42 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989); Mackey v. Pioneer Nat'l Bank, 867 F.2d 520, 526 (9th Cir. 1989);
Stewart v. American Int'l Oil & Gas Co., 845 F.2d 196, 200-01 (9th Cir. 1988); United Energy
Owners Comm. v. United States Energy Management Sys., 837 F.2d 356, 364 (9th Cir. 1988);
Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, 836 F.2d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1987); Zaldivar v. City of
Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986).
171. See generally Considine, supra note 149, at 735-36 (discussing three-tiered approach
applied in reviewing Rule 11 decisions).
The Seventh Circuit occasionally used the three-tiered approach. E.g., Brown v. Federa-
tion of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1434 (7th Cir. 1987) (reviewing factual findings
using clearly erroneous standard; legal conclusions reviewed de novo; type of sanction imposed
reviewed for abuse of discretion). The Fifth Circuit has also reviewed legal questions de novo.
See Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1126 (5th Cir. 1987), overruled on
other grounds by Thomas v. Capital See. Servs., 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988).
172. 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
173. Id. at 828.
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Prior to Cooter & Gell, the District of Columbia,1 74 Second175 and
Eleventh Circuits176 employed a variation of the three-tiered ap-
proach.1 77 These circuits gave the district courts wide discretion when
the sanction was based on a pleading that allegedly was fied for an im-
proper purpose or was not well-grounded in fact.178 If, however, the is-
sue was whether the pleading or other paper was warranted by law, these
appellate courts reviewed the legal determination de novo. 179 The appel-
late courts reviewed the type of sanction selected under an abuse of dis-
cretion standard.'8 0 The Third Circuit, although generally having
employed an abuse of discretion standard,'"' similarly exercised "plenary
review concerning the legal standards applied by the district court in ex-
ercising its discretion."' 2
174. E.g., Westmoreland v. CBS, 770 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (according dis-
trict court wide discretion for factual findings; legal conclusions reviewed de novo; type of
sanction reviewed for abuse of discretion).
175. E.g., Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1470, 1476 (2d Cir.
1988) (reviewing factual findings under clearly erroneous standard; legal finding reviewed de
novo; choice of sanction reviewed for abuse of discretion), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989); Eastway Constr.
Corp. v. New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir. 1985) (To determine whether the pleading
was groundless, "we are in as good a position to determine the answer and, thus, we need not
defer to the lower court's opinion.") (reviewing decision of sanction for abuse of discretion),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
176. E.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987) (reviewing factual,
dilatory or bad faith reasons for abuse of discretion, legal sufficiency reviewed de novo).
177. E.g., Century Prods. v. Sutter, 837 F.2d 247, 253 (6th Cir. 1988) (whether individual's
conduct was reasonable under circumstances is mixed question of fact and law and should be
reviewed for abuse of discretion; de novo review proper for pure questions of law). See gener-
ally Considine, supra note 149, at 736-37 (discussing variation on three-tiered approach),
178. E.g., Westmoreland v. CBS, 770 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (according district
court wide discretion in determining factual, dilatory or bad faith reasons for Rule 11
sanctions).
179. Id. at 1175 (reviewing whether pleading is legally sufficient de novo); Donaldson, 819
F.2d at 1556 (reviewing legal sufficiency de novo).
180. Westmoreland, 770 F.2d at 1175. The standard applied is "modified" because the
court did not specify a clearly erroneous standard of review for factual determinations.
181. E.g., Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 154-58 (3d Cir. 1986) (decision to sanc-
tion party and amount of sanction within discretion of trial court, but though trial judges still
retain substantial discretion, exercise now directed more to nature and extent of sanctions than
initial imposition); Eavenson, Auchnuty & Greenwald Corp. v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 540
(3d Cir. 1985) (applying abuse of discretion standard when reviewing choice of sanction).
182. Snow Machs. Inc. v. Hedco, Inc., 838 F.2d 718, 725 (3d Cir. 1988); see also GREGORY
P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 308 (1989) (Third Cir-
cuit generally applies abuse of discretion standard, but also employs "plenary review concern-
ing the legal standards applied by the district courts in exercising its discretion").
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IV. TESTS FOR APPLYING RULE 11 SANCTIONS
A. Pre-1983 Subjective Test for Imposing Rule 11 Sanctions
Prior to the 1983 amendment of Rule 11, the test for imposing sanc-
tions was one of subjective bad faith."8 3 Pre-amendment Rule 11 re-
quired that "to the best of [the attorney's] knowledge, information, and
belief there is good ground to support [the pleading]; and that it is not
interposed for delay."1" 4 The Rule also stated that an attorney might be
subjected to disciplinary action for a "wilful violation" of the Rule.185
The language of the old Rule suggested a subjective standard since the
Rule referred to the signer's intent in signing the pleading and the wilful-
ness of the violation.186 Finally, even after a finding of bad faith under
the old Rule, the court would not necessarily impose sanctions against
the attorney or the litigant.'87
B. Objective Test for Imposing Sanctions Under Current Rule 11
The amended Rule's focus on "reasonableness" imposes an objective
inquiry into the facts of the case before imposing sanctions.' The Advi-
sory Committee stated that "the new language stresses the need for some
prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative
183. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985) (prior to
amendment, Rule 11 spoke in plainly subjective terms), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987);
Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 348 (2d Cir. 1980) (power to shift fees if action com-
menced "in bad faith, vexaciously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons" (quoting F.D. Rich
Co. v. United States ex rel Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1978))). See generally
Edward L. Foote & R. Mark McCareins, Rule 11: Objectivity Replaces Subjectivity, in RULE
11 AND OTHER SANCTIONS 219 (1987) (discussing replacement of subjective test with objec-
tive test for pre-filing inquiry).
184. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 11 (1960). See supra note 23 for the text of the
Rule prior to amendment.
185. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 11 (1960).
186. See supra note 23 for the text of Rule 11 prior to amendment.
187. Nemeroffv. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980) (precluding award of fees under
Rule 11 since action not in bad faith); Rhinehart v. Stauffer, 638 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir.
1979) (granting motion to dismiss as deterrence without monetarily sanctioning attorney or
client after finding Rule 11 violation); Heart Disease Research Found. v. General Motors
Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 1972) (dismissing action without monetarily sanctioning at-
torney or client after finding complaint frivolous and insufficient). But see Anderson v. All-
state Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677, 684 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding abuse of court's process justified
sanctions against attorney); Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp.
975, 983 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (sanctioning plaintiff's attorney after finding abuse of judicial
process).
188. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1990); Adam-
son v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 673 (10th Cir. 1988); Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, 836 F.2d
1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1987); Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986).
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duty imposed by the Rule. The standard is one of reasonableness under
the circumstances."
' 189
In Eastway Construction Corp. v. New York1 90 the Second Circuit
determined that the revised language of the amended Rule provides for a
more expansive standard for imposing sanctions.' 91 The new Rule ex-
plicitly and unambiguously "imposes an affirmative duty on each attor-
ney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading before
it is signed." 192 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Stewart v. American In-
ternational Oil & Gas Co. 193 announced a two-part test for the
mandatory imposition of sanctions under Rule 11. The court divided
judicial review into two distinct areas of violation: (1) documents which
constitute "frivolous filings";194 and (2) documents which use "judicial
procedures as a tool for harassment."' 195
Amended Rule 11 suggests an objective test which takes certain fac-
tors into account:
[How much time for investigation was available to the signer;
whether he had to rely on a client for information as to the
facts underlying the pleading, motion, or other paper; whether
the pleading, motion, or other paper was based on a plausible
189. FED. R. Cry. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983); see Donald-
son v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987).
190. 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985).
191. Id. at 253 (subjective good faith no longer sufficient to prevent imposition of sanc-
tions); see Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 790 F.2d 1421, 1426
(9th Cir. 1986) (stating sanction mandatory for Rule 11 violation).
192. Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1559.
193. 845 F.2d 196, 201 (9th Cir. 1988).
194. Id.
195. Id.; see also Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986) (impos-
ing sanctions if documents frivolous or constitute harassment). The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals announced a similar two-part test for the mandatory imposition of sanctions under
Rule 11 in Eastway. The court, quoting the language of Rule 11, stated that sanctions should
be imposed if:
(1) "After reasonable inquiry, a competent attorney could not form a reasonable
belief that the pleading [or other paper] is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of
existing law;" or (2) "A pleading [or other paper] has been interposed for any im-
proper purpose."
Eastway, 762 F.2d at 254 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 11); see Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v.
Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir. 1986); see also McLaughlin v. Western Casu-
alty & Sur. Co., 603 F. Supp. 978, 981 (S.D. Ala. 1985) (Rule 11 imposes two duties on every
lawyer: (1) that reasonable inquiry into facts and law that applies to facts be made; and (2)
that pleadings are not interposed for improper purpose.).
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view of the law; or whether he depended on forwarding counsel
or another member of the bar.
19 6
Courts have looked to other factors as well: (1) the level and nature
of legal experience of the attorney(s) filing the pleading; 97 (2) whether
personal interviews were conducted with the parties and the witnesses, as
opposed to cursory telephone inquiries, before the pleading was filed;' 98
(3) whether pertinent and available documents were reviewed prior to
filing the pleading;19 9 (4) whether there was time pressure involved in
meeting a filing deadline;'co and (5) whether counsel blindly relied on
other attorneys as to fundamental matters of federal practice which
should be within the ready grasp of anyone litigating a federal case.20l
In applying the objective test for deciding whether an attorney has acted
reasonably, federal district court judges look to various factors before
finding a violation of Rule 11.
V. COOTER & GELL v HARTMARX CORP.: STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.202 the United States Supreme
Court reviewed the order of the United States District Court for the Dis-
196. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983); Century
Prods. v. Sutter, 837 F.2d 247, 250-51 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory
committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983)); Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th
Cir. 1987) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983)).
197. E.g., Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 790 F.2d 1421,
1426-27 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming district court's sanction order which, in part, looked at
attorney's experience in area of law).
198. E.g., Wold v. Minerals Engineering Co., 575 F. Supp. 166, 167 (D. Colo. 1983) (no
personal interviews of knowledgeable witnesses conducted, limited telephone inquiries did not
meaningfully address relevant facts).
199. E.g., Florida Monument Builders v. All Faiths Memorial Gardens, 605 F. Supp. 1324,
1326-27 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (affirming sanction order on appeal because pertinent and available
documents not reviewed prior to filing).
200. E.g., Gillette v. Delmore, 886 F.2d 1194, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (reversing Rule 11
sanction order in part because attorney under time pressure to file complaint).
201. E.g., Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1514 n.88 (11 th Cir. 1991) (stating court may
consider whether signing attorney accepted case by referral from another member of bar; time
available for investigation; extent of attorney's reliance on client's version of facts; complexity
of facts; and extent to which factual development requires discovery), cert. denied, 1991 U.S.
LEXIS 4327; Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 558 (9th Cir. 1986) (in relying
on another attorney, counsel must acquire sufficient knowledge to enable him or her to certify
that pleading is well-grounded in fact; reliance on forwarding co-counsel did not satisfy duty of
reasonable inquiry), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822 (1987), and cert denied, 484 U.S. 823 (1987);
see also FEDERAL PROCEDURE COMM'N, supra note 58, at 4-5 (discussing objective factors
district courts look to in determining whether attorney made "reasonable inquiry").
202. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
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trict of Columbia imposing Rule 11 sanctions in an antitrust action.2 °3
Danik, Inc., represented by the law firm Cooter & Gell, owned and oper-
ated discount clothing stores in the Washington, D.C. area. °4 Intercon-
tinental Apparel, a subsidiary of Hartmarx Corp., brought a breach of
contract action against Danik.2 °5 Danik filed a counterclaim alleging vi-
olations of the Robinson-Patman Act.20 6 Intercontinental Apparel won
a summary judgment motion against Danik and subsequently won a jury
trial on Danik's counterclaim.
20 7
While the litigation was proceeding, Danik filed two antitrust com-
plaints against Hartmarx and two of its subsidiaries.20 8 One of the com-
plaints alleged a nationwide conspiracy of price-fixing and numerous
other unfair competition practices. 20 9 Hartmarx moved to dismiss the
complaint and moved for the court to impose Rule 11 sanctions on the
grounds that the complaint had no basis in fact.210 In opposition to the
motion, the law firm of Cooter & Gell filed affidavits describing its prefil-
ing research.211 The total research consisted of telephone calls to a
number of men's clothing stores in four eastern cities.212 Based solely on
this limited research, the plaintiff alleged that only one store in each ma-
jor metropolitan area in the country sold Hart, Schaffner & Marx
suits.
2 13
Five months after filing the complaint, Cooter & Gell filed a notice
of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1)(i). 214 Prior to the dismissal becoming effective, the court heard
203. Danik, Inc. v. Hartmarx Corp., 120 F.R.D. 439 (D.D.C. 1988).
204. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2452.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) provides:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66, and of any statute of the United
States, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing
a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or
of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipula-
tion of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless other-
wise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice,
except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when
filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of any
state an action based on or including the same claim.
FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1).
[Vol. 25:555
RULE 11 APPELLATE REVIEW
arguments on the Rule 11 motion.2 15 Three and one-half years after the
dismissal and hearing on the Rule 11 motion, the district court ordered
Hartmarx to submit a statement of costs and attorney fees.216 In re-
sponse, Hartmarx requested $61,917.99.217 Two months later, the court
granted the motion for Rule 11 sanctions, holding that the research done
before filing the complaint was "grossly inadequate." 218 No research had
been done with regard to one subsidiary, and the research related to
Hart, Schaffner & Marx was found to be an inadequate basis for the alle-
gations in the complaint.219 Sanctions in the amount of $21,452.52 were
awarded against the law firm Cooter & Gell and $10,701.26 against
Danik.22 ° The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed
the sanctions.221
Review by the United States Supreme Court was limited to three
issues: (1) whether voluntary dismissal precluded the imposition of Rule
11 sanctions; (2) whether an abuse of discretion standard was the proper
standard of review; and (3) whether Rule 11 allows attorney fees on
appeal.
222
B. Opinion of the Court
In considering whether the voluntary dismissal of the complaint
precluded the district court from subsequently imposing Rule 11 sanc-
tions, the Supreme Court determined that even if the plaintiff dismissed
an action voluntarily, a court still had jurisdiction to impose sanctions
under Rule 11 for the original filing of the complaint.223 The Court reit-
erated that the purpose of Rule 11 is to discourage the filing of unsub-
stantiated pleadings.2 24 Once a complaint is fied and a party is required
to answer, the damage has been done.225 "Baseless filing puts the ma-
chinery of justice in motion, burdening courts and individuals alike with
needless expense and delay., 2 26 The Court determined that an attorney
215. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2452.
216. Id. The opinion did not explain why so much time had elapsed between the district
court's hearing on the motion for Rule 11 sanctions and subsequent request for a statement of
costs and attorney's fees.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 2453.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2451-52.
223. Id. at 2455.
224. Id. at 2454; see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
225. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2457.
226. Id.
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could circumvent the Rule if he or she were allowed to file an unsubstan-
tiated complaint and then escape Rule 11 sanctions by voluntarily dis-
missing the complaint.227 Depriving the court of jurisdiction would
diminish the incentive for the attorney to investigate fully before filing.228
The Court determined that nothing in Rule 41(a)(1)(i), Rule 11, or any
other federal rule or statute terminates a district court's jurisdiction or
authority to impose sanctions after a voluntary dismissal.229
The Court also addressed the contention that the court of appeals
did not apply the proper standard of review. The Court found that in
reviewing an imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, three separate issues must
be considered: (1) "factual questions regarding the nature of the attor-
ney's prefiling inquiry and the factual basis of the pleading or other pa-
per";230 (2) legal issues in determining "whether a pleading is 'warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument' for changing the law";231 and
(3) whether the district court tailored an "appropriate sanction. 
' '232
Although the court of appeals did not specify which standard of review it
used, the Supreme Court determined that appellate courts should review
district courts' selection of a sanction and findings of fact under a defer-
ential standard. 33 The Court narrowly defined the controversy over the
appropriate standard of review to "whether the court of appeals must
defer to the district court's legal conclusions in Rule 11 proceedings.
'234
The Court recognized the difficulty in distinguishing between factual and
legal conclusions235 and held that appellate courts should apply a unitary
abuse of discretion standard to all aspects of a Rule 11 proceeding.
236
The Court stated that "an appellate court reviewing legal issues in the
Rule 11 context would be required to determine whether, at the time the
attorney filed the pleading or other paper, his legal argument would have
appeared plausible.
'237
In addressing whether appellate courts may impose Rule 11 sanc-
tions for frivolous appeals, the Supreme Court reversed the court of ap-
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 2455.
230. Id. at 2457.
231. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 11).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 2457-58. The "deferential" standard advocated by the Court conforms with an
"abuse of discretion" standard. A court would give deference to the lower court's decision,
overturning it only upon a finding that the lower court had abused its discretion. Id.
234. Id. at 2458.
235. Id. at 2458-59.
236. Id. at 2461.
237. Id. at 2460.
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peals' decision, stating that Appellate Rule of Civil Procedure 38238
offered adequate protection for costs in frivolous appeals. 23 9 The Court
reasoned that appellants should not be compelled to carry the burden of
appellee's attorney's fees because that would discourage meritorious ap-
peals. 2" The Court stated, "[t]he knowledge that, after an unsuccessful
appeal of a Rule 11 sanction, the district court that originally imposed
the sanction would also decide whether the appellant should pay his op-
ponent's attorney's fees would be likely to chill all but the bravest liti-
gants from taking an appeal."241
The Court stated that Rule 11, however, is not aimed at discourag-
ing the filing of meritorious claims, but rather is designed to tell the at-
torney he or she had better have a reasonable basis in law and fact for a
pleading before filing it.242 In the same way, the attorney must have a
reasonable basis in law and fact for the appeal before subjecting his or her
opponent to the expense and the time of defending it. The Supreme
Court's argument against applying sanctions to appeals of Rule 11 sanc-
tion orders243 parallels the arguments proposed by opponents of Rule
11-that the Rule places a chilling effect on the filing of meritorious ap-
peals and may encourage satellite litigation.2' The Court emphasized
that any interpretation of the Rule must "give effect to the rule's central
goal of deterrence."245
VI. A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO THE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The abuse of discretion standard mandated by the United States
Supreme Court in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. 246 may produce ineq-
uitable results. First, applying an abuse of discretion standard to findings
of law results in the danger of stifling attorney creativity and preventing
the advancement of necessary changes in the law.247 Rather, findings of
law should be reviewed de novo to prevent disparate results and the inhi-
238. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 provides: "If a court of appeals shall deter-
mine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and single or double costs to the
appellee." FED. R. App. P. 38.
239. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2462.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 2454.
243. See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
244. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2462; see supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
245. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2462.
246. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
247. See infra notes 262-76 and accompanying text.
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bition of legal developments. 4 Second, the clearly erroneous standard
should be used for findings of fact,249 because the district court judge is
best able to evaluate the evidence and attorney conduct throughout the
proceeding.250 Third, appellate courts should use an abuse of discretion
standard to review the actual sanction imposed.25' Appellate courts
should use a three-tiered approach, such as that used by the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits prior to Cooter & Gell,252 to provide the most evenhanded
review of the various findings of fact and law and judicial discretion nec-
essary in reviewing a Rule 11 decision. Although there may be some
difficulty in application, the fairness of this review will outweigh any diffi-
culties involved. In cases where the appellant is appealing the refusal to
impose sanctions, appellate courts should rarely disturb or require expla-
nation of the district court's denial of a motion for Rule 11 sanctions.253
Courts should concentrate on whether the attorney made a reasonable
inquiry, rather than focusing on whether the inquiry is warranted by ex-
isting law. In their rulings trial courts need to specify the factual and
legal elements the decision is based upon to facilitate easier appellate re-
view; attorneys should request this information on the record.
A. Different Standards of Review Are Necessary for Distinct Findings
In a Rule 11 sanction order, the district court makes determinations
of both fact and law. The court must make factual determinations such
as whether the attorney or signing party has (1) read the pleading, mo-
tion or other paper; (2) made reasonable inquiry; (3) determined the
pleading is well grounded in fact; and (4) determined that the pleading is
248. See infra notes 262-76 and accompanying text.
249. See infra notes 256-61 and accompanying text. The clearly erroneous standard is ex-
pressly mandated for findings of fact tried without a jury by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
52. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
250. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985); Inwood Labs. v. Ives
Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982). The United States Supreme Court, in discussing the standard
of review imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 for factual findings, explained the
reasons for deference to the trial court. The Court stated that the trial judge is in a superior
"position to make determinations of credibility." Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574. Also, the trial
judge has more experience and expertise in making determinations of fact. Id. Requiring
parties to convince three more judges at the appellate level of their version of the facts would
be too great a burden. Id. at 575. Furthermore, reviewing factual determinations more closely
would only divert judicial resources for a negligible return in accuracy. Id. at 574-75.
251. The language of Rule 11 mandating that upon finding a violation of the Rule, the trial
judge shall impose an "appropriate" sanction suggests that the determination of what an "ap-
propriate" sanction should be lies within the discretion of the trial judge. There is no real
controversy about the standard of review for this aspect of a sanction order.
252. See supra notes 164-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the three-tiered
approach.
253. BURBANK, supra note 49, at 48-49.
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not interposed for an improper purpose.25 4 The court must also make
legal determinations such as whether the pleading, motion or other paper
is warranted (1) by existing law; (2) by a good faith argument for the
extension of existing law; (3) by a good faith argument for the reversal of
existing law; and (4) by the modification of existing law.255 The very
nature of Rule 11, in requiring both factual and legal determinations,
warrants the use of differing standards of review based on the district
court's reason for imposing sanctions. District courts should specify
these reasons to deter specific conduct and to provide attorneys and cli-
ents guidance as to the acceptable limits of litigation practice.
B. Factual Determinations Should Be Reviewed Under a Clearly
Erroneous Standard
It is appropriate that findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard because the district court is in the best position to
observe the conduct of the litigation.25 6 In Pullman-Standard v. Swint
25 7
the United States Supreme Court stated that Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 52(a) "does not make exceptions or purport to exclude certain cate-
gories of factual findings from the obligation of a court of appeals to
accept a district court's findings unless clearly erroneous., 258
Scrutinizing the factual findings more closely would "very likely
contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a huge
cost in diversion of judicial resources. '2 9 Critics claim that any stan-
dard of review that more carefully examines factual findings by the dis-
trict court creates the danger of spurring satellite litigation.26° One
commentator suggested that "[a]pplication of the abuse-of-discretion
standard across the board probably enhances litigants' ability to revisit
factual questions given that the prevailing alternative is the 'clearly erro-
neous' standard. Discretion might be abused even if the factual error is
not 'clear.' "261
254. FED. R. Cxv. P. 11.
255. Id.
256. See supra note 250 and accompanying text. Rule 52(a) expressly states that "[f]indings
of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous .... " FED. R. CIv. P. 52.
257. 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982).
258. Id.; Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (quoting Pullman-Stan-
dard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982)).
259. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575.
260. See id. at 574-75 (duplicating trial judge's efforts would only divert judicial resources
for negligible gain); see also supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
261. JosEPH, supra note 182, at 309.
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C. Findings of Law Should Be Reviewed Under a De Novo Standard
The proper standard for reviewing findings of law is de novo.262
"Once a court has labeled a finding not fact, or enough law that free
review is warranted, each case requires application of a de novo review
function. '263 As a rule, courts do apply different standards of review to
different issues.2 4 When reviewing a particular legal issue, the court
"has no license to venture freely into other issues of fact or the case as a
whole. ' 265 Rather, the court may only review those parts of the record
relevant to the legal issue being challenged.266
Applying a narrower standard of review for legal issues not only
stifles attorney creativity and innovation, but also hinders the enforce-
ment of controversial legislation.267 One critic assessed Rule 11 as rep-
resenting "a collision between the democraticizing values of federal
reform of the 1930s, which led to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and the efforts during the 1980s, to close the federal courts to the poor
and the powerless. '268 Another critic wrote: "[B]ecause the horizons of
262. See United States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479, 1487 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating ultimate ques-
tions flowing from factual considerations subject to independent review); Molerio v. FBI, 749
F.2d 815, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (making independent assessment of factual findings); First
Nat'l Bank v. National Bank, 667 F.2d 708, 711 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating reviewing court re-
views law de novo); Transport Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th
Cir. 1980) (stating question of law subject to de novo review); United States v. Haas & Haynie
Corp., 577 F.2d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating appellate court can review legal issues); see
supra note 140 and accompanying text.
263. 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 121, § 2.14, at 76; see also United States v. Missis-
sippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 526 (1961) (appellate court not considering original
evidence); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 600 (1985) (fullest scope of
review is for errors of law; appellate court decides questions of law de novo).
264. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988). In a case involving an analogous
issue, laches, the Third Circuit applied the three-tiered standard of review to the district court
finding. Bermuda Express, N.V. v. M/V Litsa (Ex Laurie U), 872 F.2d 554, 557 (3d Cir.
1989), cert dismissed in part sub nom. M/V Litsa v. Southeastern Maritime Co., 492 U.S. 939
(1989), and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 819 (1989). The appellate court reviewed factual findings
under the clearly erroneous standard, balancing of equities for abuse of discretion, and legal
precepts plenarily. Id.
265. 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 121, § 2.14, at 77; see also Mississippi Valley Gener-
ating Co., 364 U.S. at 526 (relying on trial court's findings of fact did not preclude Court from
making independent legal conclusions and inferences).
266. National Advertising Co. v. Arizona Dep't of Transp., 617 P.2d 50, 52 (Az. Ct. App.
1980) (court considers only those matters presented on appeal); 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra
note 121, § 2.14, at 77; FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 263, at 600 (only those issues
presented by parties' briefs and relevant portion of trial court record brought to appellate
court's attention reviewed).
267. Louis Greco, Comment, Standard of Appellate Review of Rule 11 Decisions, 58 FORD-
HAM L. REVIEW 251, 252 (1989) (stating appellate standard of review affects amount of dis-
trict court control over litigation creativity).
268. LaFrance, supra note 83, at 334.
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the law are in the process of continual expansion, an expansion that is
certainly consummated along the frontier, the line of demarcation be-
tween a frivolous and non-frivolous claim is constantly shifting."26 9 Be-
cause courts are torn between the "need to sanction overzealous
attorneys and the need to allow growth in the law,""27 Rule 11 has been
applied inconsistently.271 Requiring appellate courts to review trial court
sanction orders de novo will help curb the inconsistent application of
sanctions.272
Courts are using Rule 11 for docket management,273 thereby under-
mining "the value of open access to court embodied in the liberal plead-
ing regime of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ' 274  One way to
reduce inconsistent applications of Rule 11 sanctions is to allow appellate
courts greater latitude in reviewing sanction orders. Appellate courts are
in a better position to detect whether the Rule has particularly impacted
on distinct areas of litigation, since they review a broad range of cases
from different district courts. 275 If appellate courts were to note that a
particular line of cases was demonstrating a shift in legal thinking, they
could better determine whether the arguments put forth do, in fact, rep-
resent "a good faith argument for the modification, extension, or reversal
of existing law."
276
Although in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. 2 77 the United States
Supreme Court expressly set out the standard for reviewing Rule 11
sanction decisions as abuse of discretion "in reviewing all aspects of a
district court's Rule 11 determination,"278 the Court also stated that "[a]
district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling
on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of
269. David J. Webster, Comment, Rule 11: Has the Objective Standard Transgressed the
Adversary System?, 38 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 279, 306 (1987).
270. Id. at 308.
271. Id.
272. See supra note 120 for a discussion of the inconsistent application of Rule 11 to civil
rights cases. See also Randall Samborn, Rule 11 Tremors Continue, NAT'L L.J., July 30, 1990,
at 1, 32 (discussing lack of uniform application).
273. Comment, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100
HARV. L. REv. 630, 632 (1987).
274. Id.
275. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 263, at 600-01. "The appellate court actually is in
as good a position as the trial court to decide those legal questions and, indeed, ruling on
questions of law is one of its functions in guiding the lower courts." Id. at 601.
276. Greco, supra note 267, at 258 (stating more thorough appellate review provides greater
curb on possible district court stifling of legal creativity).
277. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
278. Id. at 2461.
January 1992]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
the evidence." '279 In Teamsters Local Union No. 760 v. United Parcel
Service280 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in effect applied this stan-
dard by closely scrutinizing legal issues. In reviewing the decision to
impose sanctions, it applied the abuse of discretion standard set out in
Cooter & Gell2 8 1 The court in Teamsters also recognized that the
Supreme Court had expressly rejected the previously used three-tiered
standard of review.2"2 Nevertheless, in determining "whether the district
court abused its discretion by basing its Rule 11 determination on 'an
erroneous view of the law,' "the Ninth Circuit seemingly conducted a de
novo review of the controlling law,283 noting that the district court had
failed to set out the controlling substantive law.284 Apparently, however,
de novo review is not limited to cases where the district court has not
revealed the substantive law. Rather, "[d]istrict courts should clearly set
forth their view of the substantive law at issue so we can provide a mean-
ingful de novo review of the controlling law before reviewing the applica-
tion of that law for abuse of discretion, as directed by Cooter & Gell."285
Thus, the Ninth Circuit suggests that Cooter & Gell allows de novo re-
view of legal issues to determine whether the district court has abused its
discretion by relying on a clearly erroneous view of the law.
D. District Court Sanctions Should Be Reviewed Under an Abuse of
Discretion Standard
Finally, in reviewing the district court's imposed sanction, the ap-
pellate court should use an abuse of discretion standard of review. No
claim has been advanced that the standard should be anything other than
abuse of discretion, since selecting an "appropriate" sanction itself entails
279. Id.
280. 921 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1990).
281. Id. at 219.
282. Id.
283. Id. (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990)). The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals seemingly took the same approach in Federal Savings & Loan
Insurance Corp. v. Molinaro, 923 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1991). In Molinaro the district court had
imposed sanctions against the plaintiffs because the court found the claim to be "frivolous,
legally unreasonable and without factual foundation." Id. at 738. The Ninth Circuit, citing
Cooter & Gell, stated that "a district court necessarily abuses its discretion when it bases sanc-
tions on an erroneous view of the law." Id. at 739. In order to determine whether the district
court had based its decision on a clearly erroneous view of the law, thereby "abusing its discre-
tion," the Ninth Circuit closely scrutinized the legal arguments which formed the basis of the
sanctions. Id. After closely scrutinizing the legal findings made by the district court, the
appellate court determined that the plaintiffs' legal arguments were "at the very least
plausibl[e]," and reversed the order imposing sanctions. Id. at 739-40.
284. Teamsters, 921 F.2d at 219.
285. Id.
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the exercise of discretion.286 Having appellate courts review the choice
of the sanction imposed for abuse of discretion promotes uniformity in
sanction awards without unnecessarily encouraging satellite litigation.
Since Rule 11 is meant to act as a deterrent, and not mark the adop-
tion of the English system,287 appellate courts should make sure that an
"appropriate sanction ' 288 is not defined as reasonable attorney fees, but
is a measured response to the conduct involved. The Third Circuit Task
Force on Rule 11 recommends that the court should "avoid routine re-
sort to expense-shifting, particularly on an attorney's fee model, which is
inconsistent with the exercise of judicial discretion contemplated by the
Rule., 289 Expense shifting "only fortuitously suits the primary goal of
deterrence, invites routine motions for sanctions, and may entail a juris-
prudence that breeds satellite litigation."290
The sanction imposed should be the least amount possible to achieve
the desired result. In a case concerning a related topic, civil contempt
sanctions, the United States Supreme Court recently reemphasized the
doctrine that in selecting contempt sanctions, a court must exercise "the
least possible power adequate to the end proposed.' 291 High sanction
awards breed satellite litigation.292 When the district courts impose a
286. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2458.
287. In England, for centuries statutes have provided for the awarding of costs, including
attorney's fees to the prevailing party. Schwarzer, supra note 16, app. A at 205. Under the
American rule, however, the prevailing party must ordinarily pay its own attorney's fees and
costs. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683-84 (1983); Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wil-
derness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. New York, 762 F.2d 243,
252 (2d Cir. 1985). The loser is not ordinarily required to pay the prevailing party's costs.
Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 684. The Supreme Court has provided for the awarding of attorney's
fees in certain exceptional situations, such as when the losing party has acted in bad faith.
Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962) (awarding attorney's fees as damages when
nonprevailing party acted with willful and persistent bad faith). Certain federal statutes have
also provided for awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party, but the rationale behind this
policy is to encourage private enforcement of the legislation. Schwarzer, supra note 16, app. A
at 206.
288. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
289. BURBANK, supra note 49, at 98.
290. I
291. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821)). In Spallone members of the Yonkers city council refused to
enact legislation implementing a consent decree earlier approved by the city. Id. at 270-71.
The legislation was to enact a public housing ordinance required in a civil rights suit. Id. at
268-69. Sanctions were imposed both on the city and individual council members. Id. at 272.
The Supreme Court affirmed the sanction against the city, but overruled the sanctions against
the individual council members. Id. at 280. The Court held that the lower court should have
first imposed sanctions against the city alone in attempt to secure compliance before sanction-
ing the council members. I
292. See supra notes 81, 290 and accompanying text.
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large monetary sanction,2 93 attorneys and their clients are likely to ap-
peal the decision because of the stigma attached to being sanctioned as
well as the desire to avoid having to pay a large fine.294 Parties often
appeal sanctions even if the cost on appeal outweighs or nearly equals the
actual sanction amount.295 Thus, imposing large sanctions against attor-
neys creates the problem Rule 11 is intended to prevent, that of increas-
ing litigation.
Since the "main purpose of sanctions ... is education and deter-
rence, even a minimal penalty may achieve this goal.297  A repri-
mand may suffice as a "sanction" when the violation is the attorney's
first.298 The impact of "the sting of public criticism delivered from the
bench," 299 although possibly constructive, may also "damage a lawyer's
reputation and career. ' ' 3°° The Ninth Circuit also stated that "[e]ven the
charge of sanctionable conduct may do unwarranted damage to an attor-
ney's reputation. '30 1 Publication of reprimand orders would "[enhance]
the deterrent effect of sanctions and help[] educate the bar about what is
expected of them under Rule 11."1302 Instead of concentrating on the
legal basis for the claim, Rule 11 motions should concentrate on what
constitutes a reasonable prefiling inquiry under the circumstances of each
293. For the purpose of this argument, $5000 is a reasonable amount.
294. Solovy, supra note 78, at 30.
295. BURBANK, supra note 49, app. E at 180. The task force found that the average cost to
sanction appellants in a single issue appeal was $15,763, whereas the average cost to sanction
appellees was $5209 when the average amount of the sanctions being challenged or defended
was about $4896. Id The higher the amount of the sanction, the more likely the appellant
attorney would personally pay the costs. Generally, the lower the amount, the more likely the
client would pay the costs. Appellee clients usually bore the costs for the appeal of the sanc-
tion. d app. E, tbl. B at 190.
296. Schwarzer, supra note 16, at 201.
297. The 1991 preliminary draft of proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure modifies Rule 11, stating that sanctions shall be limited "to what is sufficient to
deter comparable conduct by persons similarly situated." COMMIWEE ON RULES OF PRAc-
TICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 36. The
proposed amendment specifically mentions sanctions such as "directives of a nonmonetary
nature." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (Tent. draft 1991).
298. Schwarzer, supra note 16, at 201.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Townsend v. Holman, 881 F.2d 788, 790 n.1 (9th Cir. 1989) (dictum) (emphasis ad-
ded), vacated on other grounds, 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990). In reversing the district court's
decision to impose sanctions, the appellate court decided not to publish the attorney's name
because of the possible damage to his reputation simply from the charge of sanctionable con-
duct. Id.
302. Schwarzer, supra note 16, at 202. In an article written in 1988, three years after his
initial analysis, William Schwarzer warned against too great an emphasis being placed on friv-
olous claims or defenses. William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1013,
1025 (1988).
RULE 11 APPELLATE REVIEW
case, because a general consensus on that question is easier to obtain.3"3
Focusing on the factual issues, such as whether an attorney made a rea-
sonable prefiling inquiry into the facts, should reduce the amount of Rule
11 litigation while serving the interests of deterrence without chilling at-
torneys' enthusiasm or creativity. 3"
VII. CONCLUSION
Rule 11 sanctions, developed as an adjunct to efficient litigation, can
easily make the judicial system clumsy and stifle many of its most impor-
tant purposes. The Rule was developed to promote judicial efficiency
uniformly and to deter litigation abuse. Appellate review of Rule 11
sanctions is critical to ensure the intentions of the Rule are met. Appel-
late courts should adopt the interpretation of Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp. applied by the Ninth Circuit in Teamsters Local Union No. 760 v.
United Parcel Service and Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. v.
Molinaro for Rule 11 sanction analysis on review: a clearly erroneous
standard of review for questions of fact as set out by Rule 52, the custom-
ary de novo review for questions of law, and an abuse of discretion stan-
dard for determining the propriety of the sanction imposed. Using the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Cooter & Gell would protect against the
possibility of sanctions stifling new developments in the law.
Inflicting less severe penalties based on more easily identifiable vio-
lations should decrease the amount of satellite litigation, yet still deter
abuses. By modifying the uniform approach ambiguously advanced by
Cooter & Gell and by applying the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
Cooter & Gell, appellate courts would be better able to monitor arbitrary
and inconsistent Rule 11 decisions.
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